Portable workload identity research
These proposals describe how workload identity, key custody and external federation can share a portable authority model. AWS, Google Cloud, Azure, GitHub and Kubernetes are optional integration profiles in the proposed design. Trogon retains application identity, tenant ownership, authorization, audit and failure semantics.
The research baseline is repository main at 8d541e6, reviewed on 2026-11-09. The documents distinguish source observations from proposed contracts and acceptance still to execute. They do not change ADR status or establish provider support.
Reading paths
- Read Workload identity and portable trust for workload terminology, SPIRE responsibilities, activation and authorization.
- Use the runtime reference and deployment procedure for the implemented foundation, exact limits and deployment gates.
- Use registration operations and trusted-host integration for approval publication, recovery and retained identity during network work.
- Use the configuration contract reference for protobuf ownership, persisted workflow identity requirements and run admission.
- Use the portable wrapping contract for the Rust domain foundation, exact binding encoding and conformance boundaries.
- Review the federation proposal for native SPIFFE trust, inbound external workload admission, outbound provider exchange, credential custody and negative acceptance cases. F01 through F10 organize the work.
- Review the federation inventory for the first example per direction with owners, subjects, recipients and trust diagrams (F01).
- Review the JWT-SVID issuer spike for local SPIRE issuance, discovery and rotation evidence behind the issuer decision (F04).
- Review the identity and key-custody adapter roadmap for the source inventory, ADR reconciliation, adapter catalogue, dependencies and delivery gates. P00 through P44 are work-package labels; gaps between labels group the work and do not reserve ADR numbers.
Decisions that remain open
| Decision | Governing record or proposal |
|---|---|
| Portable environment/issuer qualification and foreign-domain authority | Draft ADR#0098 and the federation proposal. SPIRE is the initial implementation; equivalent issuer behavior needs qualification. |
| Independently operated production bootstrap/seal profile | Accepted ADR#0052 currently mandates cloud KMS auto-unseal with a restricted-egress exception. Portability requires an explicit amendment or supersession. |
| Wrapping and custody adoption | Draft ADR#0030 and ADR#0033, reconciled with accepted ADR#0083. |
| External assertion issuance and recipient compatibility | Draft ADR#0053, including SPIRE helper reuse and the Entra JWKS evidence question. |
| Provider-free application custody boundary | Accepted ADR#0074; the extraction and opaque-ID migration remain implementation dependencies. |
The recommended first federation proof uses independently controlled local SPIRE trust domains without a cloud, GitHub or Kubernetes prerequisite. It must demonstrate allowed access, authenticated-but-unauthorized refusal, rotation, root removal and established-session withdrawal. Provider profiles then qualify their own algorithms, claims, IAM and residual credential windows.
Acceptance of a proposal follows ADR#0000, including independent maintainer signoff. Implementation, real-provider qualification and deployed operational acceptance remain separate milestones after the decision.
