Connector HTTP Transport
FINITE_BUFFERED_HTTPS_V1 is the ordinary connection relay's transport profile. The immutable ConnectorRelease and every admitted ProxyBinding name it explicitly. These contracts specify implementation requirements; they do not claim a running transport. The relay reference defines request proof and provenance, while binding integration defines destination selection.
Supported traffic
The profile carries finite HTTPS requests and responses, fully buffered within the configured bounds. HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 may frame that traffic; a streaming socket implementation does not make application streaming supported. The TLS client verifies the provider certificate and original hostname. HTTP downgrade, CONNECT, TRACE, protocol upgrades, WebSocket, SSE and other indefinite responses are refused. Trusted MCP uses its separately bounded executor profile.
An upload is completely received and its content digest verified before custody resolution or upstream dispatch. A response is completely received and checked before any headers or body are released to the workload. Exceeding a limit aborts the operation; a partial provider response is never returned as a successful empty response. No request or response body is persisted for recovery.
Bounds and accounting
These values are platform policy choices, selected to bound memory and request occupancy rather than derived from provider quotas. An operator may lower them. Raising a default requires an audited platform configuration change, remains within the absolute ceiling and does not widen any origin or permission.
| Bound | Platform default | Absolute ceiling |
|---|---|---|
| Request content | 256 KiB | 1 MiB |
| Response content | 2 MiB | 8 MiB |
| Request header section | 16 KiB | 16 KiB |
| Response header section | 16 KiB | 16 KiB |
| Header fields per message | 128 | 128 |
| Request target, path and query | 8 KiB | 8 KiB |
| DNS, TCP and TLS connection establishment combined | 5 seconds | 5 seconds |
| Entire relay operation | 30 seconds | 30 seconds |
| Concurrent operations per grant | 4 | 4 |
A release's ProxyLimits may only lower the current platform value. Omitted fields inherit it; supplying a value below an absolute schema ceiling does not authorize exceeding the current platform value. The effective deadline is the earliest of the selected total deadline, proof expiry, grant expiry, Session or attempt end, and cancellation. The total timer starts at relay ingress and includes upload, queues, name resolution, custody, upstream transfer and checks. The connection timer is also bounded by the remaining total deadline.
Content bytes are counted after HTTP transfer framing is removed. Header bytes include each name, separator, value and line delimiter, plus the terminating delimiter; HTTP/2 uses the same uncompressed logical accounting. Count duplicate field lines separately before combining any allowed list. Relay context/proof fields count toward ingress header bounds, with the separate 4 KiB decoded context limit still applying. Enforce a process-wide concurrency and memory budget in addition to the grant cap; admission refuses capacity rather than allocating an unbounded waiting queue.
Content coding and representation policy
Version 1 accepts no Content-Encoding on either leg, including an explicit identity coding. The supervisor supplies and signs Accept-Encoding: identity and refuses a workload override. Both HTTP clients disable automatic content decoding. A provider response with a content coding fails before release even if the library could decode it. This makes the encoded and decoded content bounds identical: there is no decompressor, expansion-ratio allowance or compressed representation bypass in this profile. Supporting gzip, Brotli or stacked codings requires another reviewed profile with limits on wire bytes, decoded bytes, expansion and decoder work.
These coding rules are a deliberately restrictive project policy. HTTP defines content coding separately from transfer framing and reserves identity for Accept-Encoding; ordinary HTTP does not require this project's restriction. HTTP content coding
This profile does not decode archives, embedded encodings or arbitrary provider formats. Literal credential detection is a baseline, not a proof against every transformation a provider could return. A provider requiring stronger protection must pin a reviewed trusted response filter before admission; absent that filter, the provider/profile combination is unsupported.
Framing and completion
The transport adapter uses a strict HTTP parser. It refuses conflicting length and transfer framing, duplicate Content-Length fields even when equal, obsolete line folding, invalid field bytes and declared or actual trailers. Only the HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer coding may be decoded, within the same content, header and deadline bounds; chunk extensions are refused. An HTTP/1.1 response that requires connection-close delimiting is unsupported. Outbound authority, Content-Length and hop-by-hop fields are rebuilt from the validated buffered message. The strict subset reduces parser differences that can enable request smuggling. HTTP/1.1 framing
GET and HEAD request bodies are refused. The supervisor handles 100 Continue locally and does not forward a workload Expect field. Upstream informational responses are consumed locally, never treated as completion, and limited to four within the same aggregate header/deadline budget. 101 Switching Protocols is unsupported. SSE is refused by its parsed text/event-stream media type before reading a body. Request Range and If-Range, upstream 206, Content-Range and multipart/byteranges are unsupported; version 1 provides no range assembly.
HEAD, 204 and 304 responses carry no content under their HTTP semantics. A valid Content-Length on HEAD or 304 describes the selected representation and is not itself evidence of a payload. Retain that metadata when HTTP permits it; do not replace it with a fabricated zero. A 204 must have no Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding. A 205 response must have zero content. Illegal framing or observed illegal content on a bodyless response fails the profile. HTTP/1.1 connections are closed after bodyless responses and any residual bytes are discarded; completion does not wait for a forbidden body. This prevents stray bytes from becoming another response without claiming that an HTTP/1.1 parser can identify every byte arriving after its defined message boundary. HTTP/2 must enforce the corresponding no-content stream semantics. HTTP message content
Refusal and effect uncertainty
Unsupported or malformed workload requests produce the relay's safe INPUT_REJECTED failure before custody or provider dispatch. A response that violates this profile produces PROVIDER_RESPONSE_REJECTED with safe HTTP 502 and no provider content. A response exceeding its body cap uses RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE. An interrupted send or incomplete attributable response uses the recovery protocol's unknown-outcome rules.
A rejected response does not establish that the provider did nothing. The transport never turns an unsupported response, timeout or lost reply into an automatic resend. Recovery and audit record that distinction. Schema validation cannot prove parser strictness, byte accounting, address pinning, bodyless handling or runtime memory bounds; those need transport conformance tests.
