ADR#0037: Agent Identity Governance: Decentralized Verification under Governed Authority
Context
ADR#0036 adopts a self-certifying keypair as the agent's name, citing Nostr, and the Buzz agent platform built on it, as the reference model: the public key is the identifier, generated by anyone, verified by anyone, with no coordinator.
Nostr is not one idea, it is two, and they are separable:
- Self-certifying cryptographic identity, a technical property. A key proves itself offline, by anyone, anywhere: no phone-home to an issuer, no shared secret, no pre-registration. It is unique by construction (a 256-bit keyspace collision is not a practical concern) and portable across trust boundaries, because verifying it never depends on which party is asking.
- Permissionless decentralization, a governance stance. Anyone mints a key with no admission gate. There is no adopted revocation: a key, once minted, cannot be un-minted, only abandoned. The namespace is flat and global, with no tenant or organizational boundary above the key. Custody is personal, the holder of the private key is the only party who can act as that identity. Trust accrues only as reputation, built up over a signed history that other parties choose to weight.
ADR#0036 adopts the first without saying anything about the second, and this platform's existing decisions already reject every element of it. ADR#0026 defines a CommandAuthorizer hook for decider execution, opt-in per call site and defaulting to allow-all, so a caller that adopts it can refuse a command whose principal is merely nameable. ADR#0028 gates execution itself behind an admission limiter. ADR#0027 lets a stream resolver declare the subtree it writes into and has the store refuse anything outside it, closing exactly the flat-global-namespace shape a permissionless key space assumes. ADR#0023 and ADR#0033 put private key custody behind a platform secrets service and a tiered managed or customer-managed product model, not in the sole personal custody of whoever generated the key. And the platform carries an enterprise obligation Nostr structurally cannot express at all: to offboard an agent and revoke its standing, on demand, in a way other parties can check. A Nostr key cannot be un-existed; there is no adopted protocol message that makes a npub stop being valid.
The open question ADR#0036 leaves unanswered is which half of the Nostr model this platform actually adopts. Left unanswered, "self-certifying identity" reads as tacit endorsement of the permissionless governance it is usually bundled with. This ADR answers the question directly.
Decision
1. Verification and authority are different planes
The platform adopts the self-certifying property and rejects permissionless decentralization. It keeps the technical property, an identity that proves itself, and replaces the governance stance with the one this platform already runs: gated admission, scoped tenancy, managed custody, and revocable standing. Verification, "is this signature valid for this key", and authority, "may this key currently act", are answered on two different planes, and nothing in this decision lets one plane answer for the other.
2. Verification stays decentralized
Any party verifies an agent's signature offline against the public key anchored at the agent's genesis event (ADR#0036). No central service sits in the verification path: a verifier needs the signed payload and the anchored key, nothing else, and reaches the same answer regardless of who is asking or which party operates the platform. This is the distributed-computing property this ADR keeps from Nostr's model, unmodified: it is what makes an agent's identity portable across trust boundaries in the first place.
3. Authority is a governed plane above verification
Authority decides who may act. It never decides how a signature is checked, and it is never consulted to answer "is this signature valid", only "is this key currently authorized". Four concerns live on this plane:
- Admission. Registering an agent's identity is gated, not open to anyone who generates a key. The
CommandAuthorizerhook of ADR#0026 and the admission limiter of ADR#0028 provide the enforcement points; the authorizer is opt-in per call site, so the registration path must wire one deliberately rather than inherit the allow-all default. Registration itself requires the registrant to prove possession of the private key it claims, per ADR#0017 and ADR#0036. A key that can sign is not, by that fact alone, a key the platform has admitted. - Revocation. An agent's authorization is expressed as a published, cryptographically checkable status: a revocation event on the agent's own stream, a status-list artifact, or both. This is the same shape the X.509 world uses for CRLs and OCSP and the shape the W3C verifiable-credentials world uses for status lists: the signature check stays offline and unchanged, and currency is a separate, explicit lookup. A verifier that only checks the signature and never consults status will accept a correctly signed message from an agent the platform has already offboarded. "The signature is valid" and "the agent is currently authorized" are distinct questions, and this decision requires that they never be conflated into one check.
- Tenancy. Identity scoping follows the subject scope of ADR#0027. A self-certifying key is globally unique by construction, but which tenant an agent belongs to, and which streams it may resolve against, remains a deployment fact projected onto a scope and enforced at the store boundary, not something the key namespace itself expresses or limits.
- Entity attestation. Binding a key to a real-world claim, "this key is Acme's reviewer agent", is asserted by credentials issued on this authority plane. ADR#0036 already defers this layer; it stays deferred here. The key proves control of itself, never affiliation, and affiliation is an authority-plane credential, not a property of the key.
4. This is a model, not a protocol adoption
The platform adopts the self-certifying shape, not Nostr's protocol stack. secp256k1/Schnorr keys, the NIP-01 event format, NIP-42 and NIP-98 authentication, and relays are not part of this decision. The property is realized instead over DIDs, JWS signatures, and the AAuth plane this platform already runs (ADR#0017). The concrete cryptographic suite, key formats, and signature algorithms are pinned in ADR#0038; how a signature attaches provenance to an event is pinned in ADR#0039. Neither of those decisions is this one: this ADR fixes which governance model applies, not which bytes get signed.
5. Nostr interoperability is preserved, one path is foreclosed
An agent's identity may bind more than one key, via the stream-attested key binding ADR#0038 defines, so nothing here prevents adding a secp256k1 key later, alongside the root key, and fronting it with a bridge service that speaks Nostr's relay protocol, the same translation role a2a-bridge already plays for the A2A protocol: decode on one side, re-sign or re-frame, and carry the result over this platform's own transport on the other. That path stays open and requires no change to the identity anchor decided here.
What this decision forecloses deliberately is Nostr-native root identity, an agent whose identifier is literally an npub. That would require pinning secp256k1 as the root key algorithm from genesis, which trades away the algorithm agility ADR#0038's conditional profiles are meant to preserve. The trade is declined: Nostr reachability is an optional bridge added later, not the root identity itself.
Consequences
- Verifiers never depend on a central service to check an agent's signature, but every verifier that cares about current standing, not just past authenticity, must add a status lookup the pure Nostr model has no equivalent for. The platform keeps the power to offboard and revoke without ever becoming the party that has to sit in the verification path.
- There is no relay to run, no NIP surface to implement or keep pinned, and no flat global namespace to defend against; the governed-authority plane reuses machinery (ADR#0017, ADR#0026, ADR#0027, ADR#0028) this platform already runs for other reasons.
- The hybrid stance is now explicit and citable: "this platform has self-certifying agent identity" no longer implies, or has to be defended against implying, "this platform has permissionless agent identity." Anyone reading ADR#0036 in isolation is pointed here for the governance half of the picture.
- A revocation check becomes a required step every verifier must implement, not an optional hardening; a verifier that skips it is not wrong about the signature, it is answering a question ("was this ever valid") the caller did not ask ("is this valid now").
References
- ADR#0017: AAuth Agent Authentication over a Trogon NATS PoP Binding
- ADR#0023: Secret Management and Key Custody on OpenBao behind a Platform Secrets Service
- ADR#0026: Command Authorization Principal and Authorizer Hook for Decider Execution
- ADR#0027: Declared Subject Scope for Decider Stream Resolution
- ADR#0028: Admission Control for Decider Command Execution
- ADR#0033: Key Custody Product Model
- ADR#0036: Agent Self-Certifying Cryptographic Identity
- ADR#0038: Agent Identity Cryptographic Suite and Crypto-Agility
- ADR#0039: Self-Authenticating Event Provenance
- Buzz: Nostr-based agent identity
- Nostr Implementation Possibilities (NIPs)
- BIP-340: Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1
- W3C Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0
- RFC 7515: JSON Web Signature (JWS)
- RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile
- RFC 6960: X.509 Internet PKI Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
- W3C Bitstring Status List v1.0
- ADR index
