ADR#0036: Agent Self-Certifying Cryptographic Identity
Context
An agent needs an identity that is provable anywhere, by anyone, without a central authority issuing or vouching for it. ADR#0024 and ADR#0025 define the agent record and its configuration but say nothing about how an agent is cryptographically identified, nor how a consumer proves that an action came from a given agent. Today the genesis AgentProvisioned event carries an opaque agent_id string, display_name, parent, an AgentConfiguration, a revision, and a content_digest. Nothing ties the agent to a verifying key, so the registry holds agents with no cryptographic anchor: an agent_id alone proves nothing.
Two different things need verification, and they are independent:
- Configuration integrity, "is this the same definition?", answered by
content_digestand already present. - Actor authenticity, "did this agent produce this?", currently absent.
The prevailing solution for globally provable identity without a central allocator is self-certifying identity: the public key is the name. Nostr (which the Buzz agent platform uses), Bitcoin, and W3C DIDs all take this shape. Two properties fall out of it for free:
- Global uniqueness: a key from a 256-bit keyspace is unique with overwhelming probability, generated by anyone with no coordinator.
- Global verifiability: anyone, offline, can verify a signature against the public key; no phone-home to an issuer.
The platform already has the verification machinery. ADR#0017 binds an agent to a cnf.jwk public key and verifies proof-of-possession in trogon-aauth-verify, and ADR#0026 hands the decider a typed CommandPrincipal after authorization runs, so decide never sees keys or signatures. ADR#0023 and ADR#0033 keep private key custody on the security plane. What is missing is the binding at registration: recording the agent's public identity on the genesis event, and requiring the registrant to prove control of the key it claims.
Decision
An agent's identity is a self-certifying keypair: the public key is the name.
Self-certifying identifier. The agent's identity is derived from its root public key (a DID / JWK-thumbprint form, aligned with AAuth's
agent_jkt; the concrete algorithm, identifier method, and signature format are pinned in ADR#0038), not an opaque allocator-assigned string. Global uniqueness and global verifiability are therefore intrinsic, with no central registry.One root key in v1. A single root identity key, which is also the signing key. A two-tier hierarchy (an offline root key that only authorizes rotation, plus rotatable operational signing keys) is deferred until key operations justify it; it is a strictly additive layer that does not change the genesis anchor.
Bound at registration by proof-of-possession. Provisioning carries the agent's public key and a signature proving the registrant controls the corresponding private key. That proof is verified on the AAuth plane (ADR#0017) before
decideruns (ADR#0026); the genesis event records the public key as the agent's immutable identity anchor. No private key material ever enters a command, event, orAgentConfiguration.Public identity is a genesis fact; secrets are not. The public key is agent-owned identity and belongs on the agent record. Private keys and custody remain on the security plane (ADR#0023, ADR#0033). This is distinct from the provisioning actor ("who ran the command"), which is envelope metadata, not agent identity.
Deferred layers
These do not change the genesis anchor and are added when needed:
- Entity attestation: binding the key to a real-world entity ("this is Acme's reviewer agent") via verifiable credentials, a web of trust, or reputation accrued in the signed history. The key proves control, not affiliation.
- Global resolution: publishing the identifier-to-current-key mapping to a replicated substrate (relays, a DID method, a transparency log) so parties outside this system can resolve it. Until then the agent's event stream is the authoritative key record. ADR#0053 settles the narrower external-verifier case with an OIDC issuer and JWKS, which is what non-AAuth parties actually consume; it does not close this layer, because resolving the identifier is the part that still needs a DID method.
- Key rotation: a later signed event authorized by the current key, with the identifier held stable by the resolution layer above. Pure self-certifying identifiers are immutable, so rotation and resolution arrive together.
Consequences
- An agent is a first-class cryptographic principal: its identity proves itself anywhere, offline, without a central authority, and actions attributed to it are verifiable against the key anchored at genesis.
- The genesis contract gains the agent's public identity key;
agent_idbecomes a self-certifying identifier rather than an opaque string. Verification reuses the single AAuth path ADR#0038 fixes rather than a parallel mechanism. - The governance half of the picture, decentralized verification under governed authority (admission, revocation, tenancy, attestation), is recorded in ADR#0037; how the anchored identity extends to command and event authorship is recorded in ADR#0039.
- Global uniqueness and verifiability are obtained by construction; the harder, ongoing work (entity attestation, global resolution, rotation) is isolated in deferred layers that leave the anchor unchanged.
- Choosing self-certifying identity now forecloses an allocator-assigned opaque identity later without a migration, which is the intended trade.
References
- ADR#0017: AAuth Agent Authentication over a Trogon NATS PoP Binding
- ADR#0023: Secret Management and Key Custody Direction
- ADR#0024: Agent Platform Stream Topology
- ADR#0025: Agent Definition Data Ownership
- ADR#0026: Command Authorization Principal and Authorizer Hook for Decider Execution
- ADR#0033: Key Custody Product Model
- ADR#0037: Agent Identity Governance: Decentralized Verification under Governed Authority
- ADR#0038: Agent Identity Cryptographic Suite and Crypto-Agility
- ADR#0039: Self-Authenticating Event Provenance
- ADR#0053: External OIDC Federation Surface for Agent Identity
- Buzz: Nostr-based agent identity
- ADR index
